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INTRODUCTION: WHEREFOR THE PRIVILEGE?
Kate Stith*
This Symposium Issue features eleven papers concerned with the
fate of the Fifth Amendment, and one concerned with the fate of the
Sixth. All but one of the papers was presented at an extraordinarily
lively and enlightening series of panels organized by Professor Alex
Stein and held over two days at the Cardozo School of Law on March 2
and 3, 2008. The presentations, as well as the panel and audience
discussions that followed, wrestled with a broad range of issues. We
searched for theoretical rationales for a Privilege against compelled self-
incrimination and for coherence in present U.S. Fifth Amendment
doctrine. We examined comparative practices in other nations and
courts for insight into our own. We asked how contemporary changes
in the methods of criminal investigation might alter the significance of
the Privilege. We disagreed about the meaning of the Privilege in an
age of increasing pleas of guilty and fewer trials. And we heard a
variety of perspectives on the relationship between the Privilege, on the
one hand, and the reliability of verdicts and convictions, on the other.
The papers themselves reveal a variety of analytic and disciplinary
approaches, and a range of normative commitments. About half of the
contributions appear to share an anxiety that recent developments, in
doctrine or in practice, have eroded the Privilege and the protections it
assertedly once offered. Other contributors (as well as this reader) see
costs as well as benefits flowing from a broad Privilege. In particular,
once there is judicially-determined probable cause that the defendant
committed a crime, it seems odd not to question that person about the
crime, while videotaping or lay witnesses might better protect against
potential police abuse of suspects.
Two of the articles in this issue set out to defend the Privilege
generally, one in game-theoretic and the other in epistemological terms.
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Alex Stein's The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to
Critics1 answers objections to an important article he coauthored several
years ago. 2 The earlier article argued that the principal benefit of a
"right to silence" is to segment the pool of suspects and thereby
reinforce the credibility of statements by innocents in the pool. A key
insight of this argument is that the Privilege provides guilty suspects an
alternative to offering false exculpatory statements, thereby allowing the
investigator or fact-finder to place more confidence in the truthfulness
of those who speak despite their right to silence. According to
Seidmann and Stein's theory, the ordinary "pooling" of claims of
innocence by both guilty and innocent defendants leads fact-finders to
discount the probative value of all uncorroborated statements of
innocence. In Stein's new article, published herein, he elaborates upon
and defends this theory, noting that the anti-pooling effect is seen in
situations where the evidence against the suspect is neither very strong
nor very weak. Perhaps most impressively, Stein argues that the anti-
pooling rationale also better explains Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
than do other accounts of the Privilege.
A fundamental aspect of that jurisprudence is that the Privilege
applies only to compelled testimony. In Self-Incrimination and the
Epistemology of Testimony,3 Michael S. Pardo undertakes to develop a
theoretical justification for this limitation-and answers critics who
complain that the defendant is equally incriminated by "testimonial"
evidence and "physical" evidence, such as blood samples, fingerprints
and handwriting samples. Pardo explains that there is a fundamental
difference between these two forms of incrimination: When a witness
provides testimony, she engages in the social practice of purporting to
convey information to an audience. It is this purporting that makes a
defendant's statement different from a defendant's blood sample;
whereas the blood speaks for itself, a statement is believed-if it is
believed-in part because the defendant guarantees its truth. Under
Pardo's approach, the privilege against self-incrimination is thus an
extension of the presumption of innocence. The government, bearing
the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt, cannot shift this burden onto the defendant by requiring her to
guarantee the truth of evidence. Pardo argues that merely compelling
the defendant to participate in a lineup or produce handwriting does not
require her to vouch for the accuracy (or even the relevance) of
I Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOzO
L. REv. 1115 (2008).
2 Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000).
3 Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1023 (2008).
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whatever inferences may be drawn. Pardo uses his approach to explain
why a court-ordered polygraph would violate the Privilege-not
because the witness's actions are the products of cognition (compare
Allen, immediately below) but because the results of the test signal
whether the suspect's statements can be believed.
Not every contributor has set out to defend or justify the Privilege.
Ronald J. Allen remains puzzled that we have declared a fundamental
right to be released of the obligation to provide testimony that is clearly
relevant to the proceeding at hand on the grounds that it incriminates
oneself, as opposed to others. In his article Theorizing About Self-
Incrimination,4 Allen more broadly takes the opportunity to champion
scholarship that is descriptively accurate and empirical in nature, while
leveling criticism again three types of legal theory. His first target is
theory that attempts both to explain past decisions and to predict future
doctrinal developments. Allen criticizes the extrapolation from
descriptive to predictive accounts, which make the unwarranted
assumption that courts will reason in the future as they are alleged to
have reasoned in the past. His second target has special relevance to
much writing about the Privilege: Allen has little use for justificatory
theory that proceeds on the premise that the Privilege reflects
fundamental values of our society; Allen calls for subjecting that
premise to critical analysis. Finally, Allen posits that legal theorists
often muddle the distinction between prediction, on the one hand, and
prescription, on the other. Of equal interest to this reader is Allen's own
eminently plausible descriptive account of the Fifth Amendment as
protecting the products of cognition.
Unlike the authors just discussed, many of the contributors to this
Symposium address not the theories of, or rationales for, the Privilege
and other trial rights, but how doctrine affects actual practice in the
proverbial "real world." Alexandra Natapoff s Deregulating Guilt5
emphasizes the disconnect between stringent evidentiary and procedural
rules that govern full-fledged trials on the one hand, and the opaque
regulation of actual criminal justice practice on the other hand. She
focuses her criticism in particular on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Ruiz,6 which held that defendants are not
constitutionally entitled to material impeachment evidence (as opposed
to evidence that is exculpatory) before entering a plea of guilty.
Drawing on information theory, Natapoff concludes that an increasingly
deregulated information culture has shifted the determination of
criminal guilt from a traditional evidence-driven inquiry (i.e., the trial)
4 Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 729 (2008).
5 Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal System,
30 CARDOZO L. REv. 965 (2008).
6 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
20081
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 719 2008-2009
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
toward a concession-based approach that rewards the defendant who
submits to governmental authority (i.e., the guilty plea). With Ruiz as
the launching pad, Natapoff examines what she calls three different
"informational spheres." The first and smallest sphere is the adversary
trial-characterized by formal and complex doctrine, skilled counsel
and strong rights protections, including the Privilege and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The second sphere, to
use Natapoff s metaphor, is plea bargaining, a lightly-regulated
informational process that explicitly admits of many informational
asymmetries and inequalities. Third and largest is the investigative
sphere, which Natapoff characterizes as the "most powerful adjudicative
arena" because it is here that governmental authorities set the conditions
under which a suspect confronts the state. Natapoff powerfully builds
her argument that in sealing off the full Brady right for trials only, Ruiz
leaves many suspects unprotected in the earlier spheres, where
authorities make critical decisions and the defendant has little access to
information or other sources of power, and voices her concern that this
process is secret and mostly unregulated. Yet this reader also notes that
much criminal investigation is necessarily secretive, and if further
regulated-it is partially regulated, of course, by the Fourth Amendment
and by Miranda, neither of which are trial rights at their core-it might
simply be preceded by a yet broader "sphere" to use Natapoff's
metaphor (or an earlier "stage" to use the conventional metaphor).
Three of the Symposium articles undertake comparative analysis.
In English Warnings,7 Mike Redmayne explores the nature of the
English "right to silence" during a police interview and at trial. Under
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 (CJPOA), the suspect
or defendant has no legal obligation to speak, but fact-finders are
permitted to draw an adverse inference from silence in either domain.
In nuanced and balanced fashion, Redmayne provides a useful and
thorough examination of the case law that has developed interpreting
the CJPOA provisions; the courts have generally interpreted these
provisions narrowly, to the benefit of suspects. With the same
thoughtfulness and sensitivity to competing interests, Redmayne also
considers whether the United States should adopt similar rules. Critics
of Miranda (who are mostly found outside of the academy) argue that
current federal constitutional doctrine overly protects the guilty by
facilitating suspects in withholding information. The CJPOA increases
the provision of information by making silence less attractive. Yet there
are obvious costs to such an approach: The accused's autonomy is
infringed, and the penalty for remaining silent may potentially lead to
more false confessions. Redmayne admirably canvasses the academic
7 Mike Redmayne, English Warnings, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047 (2008).
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scholarship on CJPOA, which, not surprisingly, is highly critical. He
then considers how adopting a similar understanding of the Privilege
would affect proceedings in the United States. Of critical importance is
that in this country, but not in England and Wales, a defendant who
testifies at trial can be impeached by prior convictions and other
character evidence. Redmayne makes a good case that in these
circumstances, formally penalizing the non-testifying defendant (by
allowing an adverse inference to be drawn from her silence) "is deeply
problematic." 8
Andrew Ashworth's Self-Incrimination in European Human Rights
Law-A Pregnant Pragmatism ?9 (the only paper that was,
unfortunately, not presented in person at the Symposium) also
undertakes a thoughtful comparative analysis of the right to silence,
here tracing recognition and refinement of the Privilege by the
European Court of Human Rights. Neither the European Convention on
Human Rights nor the U.N.'s International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights explicitly bestows a Privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. Yet the Privilege has been found in these charters by the
Court in Strasbourg; Ashworth sets out to explain how and why. The
underlying premise of the doctrinal development is that forced self-
incrimination violates the right to a fair trial, which is guaranteed in
Article 6 of the Convention. Interestingly, the original 1993 case
enunciating the Privilege dealt with a subpoena for physical records
(bank statements), not testimony. Several years later, the Court held
that there is a right to silence at police questioning, though it permitted
an adverse inference to be drawn, and subsequently held that testimony
obtained under threat of contempt could not be used in a subsequent
prosecution of the witness. The precise contours of Europe's new
Privilege doctrine continue to be developed, but in ways that generally
frustrate theorists because the Court often undertakes a form of
balancing analysis, weighing the individual's interests against those of
the government. While he rejects such a balancing approach, Ashworth
nonetheless recognizes that the Privilege cannot protect every person
from ever producing documents or information needed by the
government in a highly regulated society. He discusses, for instance,
recognizing exceptions for "relatively minor offences connected to
voluntary social enterprises" and for production of information
regarding taxation and other regulatory requirements. He rejects as
"unprincipled," however, the Strasbourg Court's apparent willingness to
jettison the Privilege in cases involving the most serious crimes. Yet
this reader notes that there certainly are principles or values that can
8 Redmayne, supra note 7, at 1088.
9 Andrew Ashworth, Self-Incrimination in European Human Rights Law---A Pregnant
Pragmatism?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 751(2008).
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justify such a limitation; it may be that Ashworth, like many other
noteworthy scholars of jurisprudence, rejects "balancing" approaches as
inherently unprincipled.
Unlike the other two comparative papers, the contribution by Kent
Roach addresses not the general contours of the Privilege, but its
application and consequences (intended and unintended) with respect to
a particular type of investigation-terrorism investigations after 9/11.
In The Consequences of Compelled Self-Incrimination in Terrorism
Investigations: A Comparison of American Grand Juries and Canadian
Investigative Hearings,10 Roach contrasts immunity practice in our
federal courts with the self-incrimination regime in Canada. He argues
that while the news media have focused on particularly abusive
information extraction practices (such as "water-boarding"),
developments in immunity doctrine and practice may be of wider and
deeper significance. At the core of Roach's article is the simple but
often overlooked insight that the U.S. Constitution does not give an
individual the right not to be compelled to provide incriminating
evidence; it only prohibits the use and derivative use of this testimony
in the prosecution of the witness herself. Moreover, the courts have
defined derivative use so broadly that the effect is to make it highly
unlikely that an immunized witness can be prosecuted for the
underlying crime about which she testifies. Roach explains how the
power to grant immunity affects the exercise of investigative and
prosecutorial discretion, and argues that it may have a particularly
distorting effect in cases involving terrorism. Witnesses who have been
arrested under a material witness warrant may find their testimony
delayed until it is clearer whether the witness is a member of the
criminal conspiracy, at which point they might not be called to testify
despite having been detained. Other witnesses might be immunized but
then transferred to a jurisdiction elsewhere in the world that does not
recognize such protections. Yet others may be granted immunity but
end up being prosecuted for obstruction of justice or perjury. Let me
make clear that Roach is not arguing that persons arrested under a
material witness warrant (or witnesses who are given use-and-derivative
use immunity) should never be prosecuted; moreover, he is unusually
sensitive to the uncertainties and dilemmas that investigators and
prosecutors face in deciding whether to immunize an apparent witness
in a terrorism case. Rather, his concern is that immunity grants to
overcome the Privilege produce a distorting influence on how terrorism
cases are investigated, who is arrested and detained, and, ultimately,
who can be prosecuted for what crimes. Roach's argument is clear and
10 Kent Roach, The Consequences of Compelled Self-Incrimination in Terrorism
Investigations: A Comparison of American Grand Juries and Canadian Investigative Hearings,
30 CARDozo L. REv. 1089 (2008).
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thought-provoking. While this reader wonders whether the bigger
culprit here is the overly-broad reach of use and derivative use
immunity, Roach remains committed to the constitutional desirability of
a broad Privilege and broad immunity grants.
In Corporate Confessions,"1 Brandon L. Garrett addresses with
considerable nuance a very different context in which the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination provides little
protection to a would-be defendant. Artificial entities such as a
corporation are not protected by the Privilege. At the same time, the
broad scope of (federal) criminal liability of corporations provides for a
form of vicarious liability that is nowhere else countenanced in the
criminal law. Yet corporations are not without defensive weapons.
Corporations conducting internal investigations under the umbrella
protection of the attorney-client privilege (which is very broad in
federal law and under the law of most states) can gather information and
use tactics unavailable to prosecutors. For instance, employees may be
fired for non-cooperation, and even apart from such threats they may be
especially forthcoming to a lawyer speaking to them at their worksite.
Garrett observes that constitutional safeguards provide employees little
protection in such investigations unless the corporation is formally
acting as an agent of government investigators or prosecutors (in which
case compulsion is not allowed, and Miranda applies). Employees
therefore must rely on employment contracts and appeals to their firms'
perceived self-interest for protection. So-called "Adnarim" warnings
(Miranda spelled backwards), for example, may be given by corporate
counsel to inform employees that the lawyer in the room represents the
corporation and not the employee. Although these warnings are not
constitutionally required, firms frequently find pragmatic reasons to
explain potential conflicts of interest. In addition, employees with a
contractual right to attorneys' fees will frequently avail themselves of
separate counsel. Garrett considers whether the pressure on
corporations to cooperate is great enough to treat them, ipso facto, as
government agents, but ultimately concludes (persuasively to this
reader) that such a conclusion is practically unwarranted and doctrinally
unavailable. Still, he urges government investigators and prosecutors to
reward rather than punish firms that honor their employees' contractual
protections, and to seek only corporate cooperation that "elicits
informed, sound, and conflict-free statements by employees.' 2
In light of apparent gaps in Fifth Amendment coverage, two
authors propose new strategies to strengthen the right against compelled
self-incrimination and other rights that apply outside of (as well as at)
trials. Like Garrett, Erica Hashimoto calls for prosecutors to conform
1 Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 917 (2008).
12 Id. at 946.
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their behavior to a proposed ethical standard. In Toward Ethical Plea
Bargaining,13 however, Hashimoto goes one step further, arguing that
the ethical standard should be codified in the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules already requires that prosecutors
make "timely" disclosures to defense counsel of information "tending to
negate the guilt" of the accused, but it is not clear what "timely" means
nor exactly which types of disclosures are required. As does Natapoff,
discussed previously, Hashimoto takes aim at the Court's recent
decision in Ruiz, 14 which Hashimoto thinks (contrary to this reader's
judgment) may be extended in the future to deny defendants who plead
guilty a right to any Brady material, even that which exculpates the
defendant. Moreover, she notes that the increasingly common practice
of requiring defendants who plead guilty to waive their right to appeal
means that there may be no available legal forum for these defendants
to assert constitutionally or statutorily based discovery rights. To
strengthen and clarify the obligations of prosecutors, Hashimoto
proposes that Rule 3.8 be amended to apply to pre-plea disclosures and
to apply to all exculpatory and impeachment evidence. This approach
has advantages for defendants. First, a prosecutor's ethical
obligations-as opposed to defendant's rights-cannot be waived.
Second, as Hashimoto notes, the Bagley materiality standard (which
considers whether the fact-finder might have reached a different verdict
had the information been provided) 15 is ill-suited to plea bargaining.
Hashimoto does not mention yet another reason that obtaining a remedy
for a Brady violation in the plea context will often be impossible:
Assuming that a defendant who seeks to withdraw her plea due to a
Brady violation must make the same showing that is required for
withdrawal due to ineffective assistance of counsel,' 6 she would have to
prove that she would not have pled guilty (as opposed to proving she
would have received a better plea deal) had the particular information
been disclosed to her. In sum, Hashimoto presents a most interesting
proposal, and this reader looks forward to her future examination of
institutional structures that would provide incentives and resources to
litigate arguable breaches of the proposed new requirement in Model
Rule 3.8.
In The Confessional Penalty,17 Talia Fisher and Issachar Rosen-Zvi
also contemplate a new strategy that they argue would curb violations of
defendants' rights. Their particular concern is with false confessions.
13 Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949 (2008).
14 Ruiz, supra note 6.
15 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
16 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
17 Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 871
(2008).
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Although they do not explicitly assume that all such confessions are
produced through "compulsion" violating the Privilege, they argue that
the Privilege and other evidentiary rules do little to prevent false
confessions. There is an incentive to rely on confessions, they say,
because they are inexpensive to obtain relative to other means of
obtaining proof of guilt. This itself would not be problematic, but
becomes so (the authors argue) because judges, police and jurors are
prone to overestimate the veracity of confessions and their own ability
to sort true from false confessions. Fisher and Rosen-Zvi therefore
propose a "confession penalty." In the current regime, confessing
defendants may receive shorter sentences, at least if the confession leads
to a plea of guilty. Under Fisher's and Rosen-Zvi's regime, trials that
end in conviction would likewise result in a reduced sentence if the
government presented the defendant's confession as evidence at the
trial. Assuming that prosecutors seek to maximize years meted out as
punishment (a thoroughly unrealistic assumption, but acceptable for
pedagogical purposes here), this proposal would discourage prosecutors
from relying on confessions and encourage them to obtain other
evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, either to secure a
conviction at trial or to provide an incentive for the defendant to plead
guilty. Fisher and Rosen-Zvi recognize that recent empirical studies of
erroneous convictions suggest that false confessions are a source of
error only in certain types of crimes, especially murder cases; other
sources of error, in particular erroneous witness identifications, are a far
greater source of error in, for instance, rape cases. This reader notes
that if we were in fact to adopt a "confessional penalty," the effect could
be to reduce the penalty for murder, while not addressing the serious
problem of wrongful convictions in rapes and robberies. Indeed, this
reader worries that a "confessional penalty" might constitute an
incentive for rapists to murder their victim/witnesses.
Kenworthey Bilz, in Self-Incrimination Doctrine is Dead; Long
Live Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 18 argues that technological change has
already reduced reliance on confessions. In the first part of her paper,
Bilz explains that expert testimony and evidence obtained from forensic
technologies such as biometric data (e.g., DNA profiling), location
tracking, and data mining are increasingly being used in court due to the
rapidly improving reliability, availability, and falling costs of these
techniques. She then infers that such forensic evidence will replace the
need for confessions and eye-witness testimony. In Bilz's estimation,
such "traditional evidence" is, compared with the new forensic
evidence, unreliable and expensive, in terms of both direct costs and
18 Kenworthey Bilz, Self-Incrimination Doctrine is Dead; Long Live Self-Incrimination
Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, and the Anxieties of the Liberal State, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 807 (2008).
2008]
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 725 2008-2009
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
indirect societal costs-most importantly, wrongful convictions. The
author ventures that the observed rise in the use of forensic science in
the United States can thus be expected to correlate with a decline in the
use of confessions, given limited resources. In the second part of her
paper, Bilz proceeds to a novel and intriguing argument: Despite the
diminishing importance of confessions, the advent of forensic evidence
has not eliminated certain fundamental anxieties associated with the
"confession era." She identifies these anxieties as including fear about
the overreaching power of the state relative to the individual, and fear
about the possibility that certain types of evidence can undermine the
importance of the citizen-jury in our adversarial system. In Bilz's view,
forensic evidence may be more empirically reliable than confessions
and eye-witness accounts, but its use can still undermine the adversarial
system or foster state coercion of the individual, just as is true of a
regime that relies on confessions. Bilz asserts that the evolving doctrine
governing the admissibility of scientific evidence (as set forth in, for
instance, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert line of cases)
reflects these same anxieties. According to Bilz, this is why despite the
greater reliability of forensic technologies, skepticism about scientific
evidence in criminal law has increased. Still, this reader would give
greater weight than does Bilz to the potential of the new forensics to
reduce the principal anxiety about use of confessions and eye-witness
testimony: conviction of the innocent (see the discussion of the Fisher
and Rosen-Zvi article above).
Concerns about state power and about the reliability of convictions
are not limited to discussions of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, of
course. One of the papers at the Symposium discussed some of these
concerns in the context of the trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. In The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing,19
Stephanos Bibas and Susan Klein describe how the Supreme Court has
dramatically redefined modem sentencing jurisprudence over the past
several terms. Blakely20 (prohibiting an increase in the lawful sentence
on the basis of judicial fact-finding at sentencing) and Booker
2'
(applying the Blakely rule to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines)
originally emerged, in the authors' view, as curious departures from
precedent. Now that they have become permanent fixtures in-indeed
the very foundation of-sentencing law, commentators have scrambled
to assess their likely impact. In an admirable contribution to this effort,
Bibas and Klein discuss the implications and effects of a recent trilogy
19 Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30
CARDOzO L. REv. 775 (2008).
20 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 961 (2004).
21 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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of Supreme Court decisions-Rita 22, Kimbrough,23 and Gal124-in
which the Court continued Booker's transformation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines from "mandatory" to what the reader might term
"rebuttably recommended. ' 25 While these cases will not have an
immediate impact on most state sentencing schemes, because most
states do not rely on mandatory or presumptive guidelines, federal
sentencing outcomes may change significantly. In particular, Bibas and
Klein predict that recent rulings will inject greater uncertainty into
sentences, and hence into plea negotiations, and that this uncertainty
will generally redound to the benefit of defendants for three reasons.
First, they contend that knowing the prosecutors seek to avoid
uncertainty, federal defendants and defenders will be psychologically
emboldened to negotiate lower sentences. Second, because judges are
now empowered to "inject their own policy views" 26 at sentencing, and
as a general rule federal judges consider the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines too harsh, judges will use their new authority to impose
lower sentences. Third, the recent sentencing decisions of the Supreme
Court have reduced the credibility of prosecutors who threaten
retaliation (and higher sentences) if the defendant does not accept the
plea offered. Together these factors will provide additional bargaining
power to criminal defendants, and as a consequence will yield lower
sentences-both in the federal system and in the few state regimes that
are affected by the Blakely rule. Bibas and Klein are also to be
commended for their most helpful Appendix, which sets forth the
sentencing regime in each jurisdiction and notes which states will be
affected Blakely and its progeny. This reader looks forward to the
authors' examination, in a future paper, of the impact of Blakely and
Booker on the reliability of guilty pleas and the issue of wrongful
convictions, the animating concerns of so many papers in the
Symposium.
Together, the articles published in this Symposium Issue represent
a thoughtful, well-reasoned collection of essays that push modem Fifth
Amendment (and Sixth Amendment) scholarship toward new frontiers.
The Cardozo Law Review and Professor Alex Stein are to be
22 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
23 Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
24 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
25 See generally Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise
of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008).
26 Bibas & Klein, supra note 19, at 780.
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congratulated for arranging this unusual opportunity to engage in depth
the fundamental question at hand: Under what circumstances may civil
society require testimony or other evidence that will implicate the
witness in commission of a crime?
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